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Going from Low Inflation 
to Price Stability in Spain 
Juan J. Dolado, JosC M. Gonzhlez-Pkamo, and JosC Viiials 
One of the most significant general economic developments of recent years in 
the industrialized countries has been the increasing orientation of  macroeco- 
nomic policies-and  of  monetary policies in particular-to  achieving lower 
inflation rates. In some countries, this trend has crystallized into legal reforms 
establishing price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy while at the 
same time granting extensive independence to central banks for achieving that 
goal. In  other countries, even if  there have been no specific legal changes, 
monetary policy has been pursuing direct inflation targets in order to enhance 
the transparency of the authorities’ commitment to price stability. Finally, even 
in many of  the countries that have maintained their earlier legal norms and 
monetary policy arrangements, there has been a de facto strengthening of the 
anti-inflationary orientation of monetary policy. 
The above developments have been of particular importance in recent years 
within the European Union in the context of  the preparations to establish a 
fully fledged Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. Accordingly, the 
convergence criteria laid out in the Treaty of Maastricht to select future EMU 
participants specify that national inflation rates cannot be more than 1.5 per- 
centage points higher than the average of  the three lowest in the European 
Union. Furthermore, the statutes of  the future European System of  Central 
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Banks establish price stability as  the  primary goal of  European monetary 
policy. 
At the end of 1996, when this paper was written, the annual inflation rate in 
the European Union stood at 2.5 percent, a significant improvement from the 
6 to 7 percent registered in the previous decade. Nevertheless, since price sta- 
bility is typically taken to mean an inflation rate of between 1 and 2 percent, 
and since almost all EU national central banks either already have price stabil- 
ity as the primary goal of monetary policy or will do under the Maastricht 
Treaty provisions, it is expected that further disinflation will be a major policy 
goal in Europe. For this reason, it is of the foremost importance that an attempt 
be made to properly estimate the costs and benefits of moving from low infla- 
tion to price stability. 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct such a cost-benefit analysis for the 
Spanish economy. In Spain, in spite of the long-lasting disinflationary process 
that started in the second half of the seventies, the average annual inflation rate 
still stood around 3.5 percent at the end of  1996. If  for the sake of simplicity 
we  define price stability as the midpoint of  the 1-2  percent inflation range 
(1.5 percent), then moving from low inflation to price stability implies further 
lowering inflation by about 2 percentage points.' 
While we have followed the above route for the sake of comparability with 
the other country studies in this volume, there is admittedly some uncertainty 
about the inflation rate that exactly constitutes price stability in the case of 
Spain. If, for example, it were to be considered that an inflation rate of 2 per- 
cent-rather  than  1.5 percent-more  adequately represents price  stability, 
then going from low inflation to price stability would mean further lowering 
inflation by  1.5  rather than 2 percentage points. In this case, the cost and bene- 
fit estimates presented in the paper could easily be rescaled. 
Because the channels though which inflation affects the economy are mul- 
tiple and highly complex (see Fischer and Modigliani 1978; Fischer 1994), any 
empirical analysis of the gains and losses to be made when lowering inflation 
is bound to be partial and highly speculative. The route taken in this paper- 
within the framework of the NBER project on the costs and benefits of achiev- 
ing price stability-consists  of making a macroeconomic estimate of the costs, 
and a microeconomic estimate of the benefits, of moving from low inflation to 
price stability in  Spain. Regarding the costs, we  evaluate the output losses 
through estimates of  the well-known sacrifice ratios. Regarding the benefits, 
we follow Feldstein's (1997) approach and focus on the distortions resulting 
from the interaction between inflation and the Spanish tax system. 
The main virtue of the approach followed in the paper is to make a compact 
and relatively homogeneous comparison between the costs and benefits of 
1. An inflation rate of  1.5 percent probably comes close to being the upper bound of  what we 
guess could be the measurement bias in the Spanish consumer price index (CPI). Unfortunately, 
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achieving price stability. Its main pitfall is that by focusing on the interactions 
between inflation and the tax system it ignores some of the channels through 
which lowering inflation might convey further economic benefits. All in all, 
however, the assessment provided in this paper is a useful starting point for 
ascertaining whether policies geared toward achieving price stability in Spain 
are justified from the standpoint of the general interests of society. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.1 assesses the likely 
economic costs of reducing inflation by 2 percentage points in Spain by esti- 
mating a simple two-equation macromodel of  inflation and unemployment. 
Section 3.2 calculates the size of the likely economic benefits of reducing in- 
flation by  2 percentage points, taking into account the main sources of inter- 
action between inflation and the Spanish tax system. The concluding section 
compares costs and benefits and makes an overall assessment of the magnitude 
of the net benefits to be gained in achieving price stability. 
3.1  Measuring the Costs of Disinflation 
The purpose of this section is to estimate the “sacrifice  ratio” for the Spanish 
economy, that is, how much output will be lost for each percentage point of 
permanent reduction in inflation. Because the relevant relationship that we 
seek to identify is what will be the real impact of  a permanent reduction in 
inflation induced by a contraction in aggregate demand, it is important to have 
a model that can distinguish between supply and demand shocks. For this pur- 
pose, we adapt to the Spanish economy the general framework proposed by 
King and Watson (1994) with the modifications introduced by Dolado, L6pez- 
Salido, and Vega (1996). While the model explores the dynamics of inflation 
and unemployment, its results regarding the sacrifice ratio can be easily trans- 
lated into output losses through Okun’s law. 
As figure 3.1 shows, the evolution of inflation and unemployment in Spain 
is rather different before and after 1979. Before 1979, there were periods when 
inflation and unemployment moved in the same direction as a result of supply 
shocks. Thereafter, inflation and unemployment generally show an inverse re- 
lationship. For the sake of precision, table 3.1 reports means, standard devia- 
tions, and correlations for various subintervals in the 1964:l-95:4 period. The 
stagflationary episodes are clearly shown in the first three periods. In the rest, 
the correlations between inflation and unemployment are negative, with the 
exception of the 1986-91  period, where no correlation is present. However, 
because these simple correlations are dominated by  both demand and supply 
shocks, they are not informative about the nature of the driving forces behind 
them. To disentangle the sources of these correlations and analyze the implicit 
Phillips curve trade-offs following a shock in aggregate demand we estimate a 
simple, but rather informative, empirical macromodel. 
The basic model is that of King and Watson (1994) and consists of the fol- 








Fig. 3.1  Inflation and unemployment in Spain 
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Equation (1) can be interpreted as an aggregate supply equation (Phillips 
curve) where inflation depends on unemployment-past  and present-as  well 
as lagged values of inflation.  The error term E,~  is the “supply” shock. Equation 
(2)  can be interpreted as an aggregate demand equation where unemployment 
depends on present and past inflation and past unemployment. The error term 
cdl  is the “demand” shock. 
The variables in the equations are expressed in first-difference form since u, 
and IT, show clear signs of  unit-root behavior and are non-cointegrated over 
the sample period. Under the present specification, the “long-run” effects of 
disturbances  edr  and E,, can be estimated. In particular, the sacrifice ratio stem- 
ming from a disinflationary process can be computed as 
2 [  Aut+k’AEdt)  when AIT,,~  = -  I  fork +  -. 
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Table 3.1  Summary Statistics 
Unemployment  Inflation 
Sample 
-  ~ 
Sample Period  U  S”  7r  s,  Correlation 
1964: 1-70:  1  1.23  0.25  6.20  3.65  0.7  1 
1970:2-73:3  1.77  0.53  7.95  1.88  0.7  1 
1973:4-79:2  4.70  1.79  16.90  3.13  0.32 
1979:3-86: 1  16.25  4.10  12.07  2.27  -0.90 
1986:2-91:4  8.33  1.94  6.08  9.15  -0.04 
1992:  1-94: 1  21.01  2.70  5.08  0.76  -0.80 
1992: 1-95:4  22.05  2.36  4.85  0.65  -0.79 
Nore; X denotes the sample mean, and s,  the sample standard deviation (x = u, 7~).  The sample 
correlations correspond to the HP filtered series. 
Naturally, a preliminary step to be discussed is how the primitive shocks are 
estimated since the previous structural system is not identified without further 
restrictions. Thus, as is standard in the vector autoregression (VAR) literature, 
we estimate the reduced-form VAR model 
(3) 
(4) 
(where a(L),  b(L),  c(L),  and d(L)  are polynomials in the lag operator L) and 
recover the structural shocks from the residuals in equations (3) and (4). To  do 
so, we assume, as is customary, that the demand and supply shocks are orthog- 
onal plus the following restriction: in the long run, inflation is purely a mone- 
tary phenomenon; that is, the long-run stochastic trend of inflation is governed 
only by demand shocks2  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the latter restric- 
tion does not necessarily impose a fully vertical Phillips curve in the long run. 
Whether this is the case or not in reality will be revealed by the empirical esti- 
mate~.~ 
The structural VAR model is estimated for Spain for the period 1964:  1-95:4, 
yielding estimates regarding the unemployment costs of permanently bringing 
down inflation at different  horizon^.^ In particular, after five years the long-run 
sacrifice ratio (in terms of  higher unemployment per percentage point reduc- 
tion in inflation) is estimated to be 1.3. Using Okun’s law (around 2.0 for Spain) 
2. While other identifying restrictions were considered that were closer in spirit to “Keynesian” 
or “real business cycle” models, the “monetarist” restrictions considered in the text seemed to be 
more reasonable. See Dolado et al. (1996) for a comparison of the three cases. 
3. This is so because the long-run Phillips trade-off, i.e., lim (A~,+,/AE~,)/(AT,+,/Ac,,)  when 
t +  00, is equal to [d + (1 -  b)O]/[(l -  c) + ae], where a, b, c,  and d are the gains of the 
lag polynomials a(L),  b(L), c(L),  and d(L)  in eqs. (3) and (4), and 0 = 1/6. It is easy to check that 
the monetarist case corresponds to O = 0. Thus, even if 8 = 0, the trade-off differs from zero un- 
less d = 0. 
4. The VAR  is estimated using first differences of EU12 inflation and unemployment rates as 
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Table 3.2  Output Costs of Moving to Price Stability 
Authors 
output Loss (% 0 
Country  GDP per year) 
Dolado, L6pez-Salid0, and Vegaa 1996  Spain  1  .o 
Andris, Vallts, and Mestre 1996  Spain  0.9 
This paper  Spain  0.6-1.0 
Ball 1997  Cross section of OECD countries  1.1-1.7 
”Monetarist case 
to express the sacrifice ratio in terms of cumulative output losses (every five 
years) per percentage point of  inflation reduction, it becomes 2.6 percent of 
GDP. This implies that the cost of reducing inflation by 2 percentage points in 
Spain is about 1 percent of  GDP per year, its permanence being due to the 
existence of full hy~teresis.~ 
In order to assess how reasonable our estimates are it is useful to look at 
the-unfortunately  not very abundant-evidence  obtained by  other authors 
regarding the sacrifice ratio in Spain (see table 3.2). In a recent paper, Andres, 
VallCs,  and Mestre (1996) make use of  a small quarterly macroeconometric 
model to compute the sacrifice ratio of permanently reducing inflation in Spain 
by  2 percentage points. They conclude that these costs are about 0.9 percent 
of GDP per year on a permanent basis, which is very similar to the 1 percent 
of  GDP we  find under our identification restriction. Other authors, however, 
obtain once-and-for-all (rather than permanent) output costs. For example, ac- 
cording to Ball (1994), reducing inflation by 2 percentage points would lead 
in Spain to a cumulative total output loss of slightly less than 2 percent of GDP. 
Nevertheless, as the author himself acknowledges, this estimate is based on 
the “a priori”  assumption of  no hysteresis, which seems to be at odds with 
much  of  the empirical evidence for  Spain. Indeed, in  another paper,  Ball 
(1997) himself presents cross-sectional empirical evidence that suggests that 
hysteretic effects have been common in OECD countries during recent disin- 
flationary episodes. His results suggest that a permanent reduction in inflation 
by  2 percentage points comes with a permanent annual output loss of about 
1.1 percent of  GDP-a  number remarkably close to the 1 percent estimated 
with our small macromodel. 
So far, we have relied on the sacrifice ratio computed from the bivariate VAR 
model for the Spanish economy that was presented in equations (3) and (4). 
Nevertheless, a controversial and somewhat discomforting implication of the 
model is that there seems to be a permanent Phillips curve trade-off even under 
the sensible assumption that inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon in the 
5. In the Spanish case, there is ample evidence of  full hysteresis nowadays, with the proportion 
of workers unemployed for spells longer than a year (two years) close to 60 (40) percent. 101  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability in Spain 
long run. Therefore, it is important to explore whether this result is robust to 
changes in the specification of the model. 
As pointed out by  Evans (1994), it may be the case that what this sort of 
model identifies as demand shocks are not  necessarily (nominal) monetary 
shocks but a mixture of these and (preference) consumption shocks or fiscal 
policy shocks. Since our framework so far consists of a two-variable system 
we are just able to identify pooled demand shocks. Thus, to disentangle a pure 
“monetary” shock, one possibility is to add a third variable (x,) to the system 
that contains information about “nonmonetary” shocks so that E~,  can be inter- 
preted appropriately. Empirically, this is done by adding lagged values of x,  to 
the system of equations (3) and (4), allowing x, to be influenced by contempo- 
raneous values of u, and  IT^ in its own equation (technically the original demand 
and supply shocks are treated as Wold-causally prior to the third shock). We 
considered several candidates for x, and found logged government current ex- 
penditure (in second differences) to be suitable. In this case we found that 
the long-run trade-off was marginally insignificant, giving rise to a cumulative 
transitory loss of output of 10 percent of GDP per 2 percentage points of infla- 
tion reduction. These numbers are about twice those taken by Feldstein (1997) 
as representative of  the total output cost for the United States, which seems 
about right given the significantly larger increases in unemployment registered 
in Spain during past disinflationary episodes. 
As shown, new results arising from attempting to distinguish between mon- 
etary  and  nonmonetary  shocks yield very  different implications regarding 
whether a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment exists (i.e., 
whether the output costs are transitory or permanent). Nevertheless, it is inter- 
esting to note that for the purposes of the exercise we want to perform in this 
paper, this very crucial conceptual difference can easily be taken into account 
from an empirical viewpoint. This can be seen once we express the total tran- 
sitory output costs of moving to price stability (10 percent of GDP) in terms 
of  an annual stream of costs with the same present value, which we can later 
compare to the annual stream of benefits to be estimated in section 3.3. As in 
Feldstein, the discount rate that we use to perform the above calculation is the 
difference between the average after-tax real rate of return that an individual 
investor received from investing in the stock market (9.5 percent in the Madrid 
Stock Exchange for the 1985-95  period) and the average real growth rate of 
the economy (2.5 percent in Spain).6  This yields an equivalent permanent an- 
nual stream of costs of 0.6 percent of GDP, which is significantly below the 
permanent annual loss of  1 percent of GDP estimated with the original version 
of the model. 
Thus, while there may be some controversy about whether the costs of mov- 
6. See section 3.3 for the derivation of  the discount rate. While the cumulated output loss is 10 
percent of GDP, its present value is 9.1 percent of GDP. Thus (0.07)(9.1)  = 0.64 percent of GDP. 102  Juan J. Dolado, Jose M. Gonzalez-Paramo,  and Jose Viiials 
ing from low inflation to price stability in Spain are transitory or permanent, 
and while recognizing that this as yet unsettled empirical issue has profound 
conceptual implications for one’s view  of  how the economy works, for our 
purposes it amounts to taking an annual cost estimate of 0.6 percent of GDP 
in the transitory case and  1 percent of GDP in the permanent case. Taking a 
conservative stance, in what follows we will consider that going from low in- 
flation to price stability in Spain will be worthwhile if the benefits from such 
a move are at least 0.6 to 1 percent of GDP per year on a permanent basis (see 
table 3.2). 
It can be reasonably claimed that the estimates we  and other researchers 
obtain for the sacrifice ratio in Spain may understate the true output costs of 
going from low inflation to price stability because these costs are likely to 
increase as the inflation rate gets lower (i.e., the Phillips curve gets flatter). On 
the other hand, there are also reasons to believe that historical estimates of the 
sacrifice ratio may overall significantly overstate the actual costs of disinflation 
to be faced by the Spanish authorities nowadays. First, our experience has been 
that with sufficiently low rates of inflation, indexation mechanisms are deacti- 
vated, which enhances relative price and real wage flexibility. And second, the 
disinflationary experiences of the past-on  which econometric estimates are 
based-took  place in a context characterized by a high degree of regulation in 
goods and factor markets, a lack of central bank independence, and an inter- 
nally unbalanced macroeconomic policy mix. Very likely, this exacerbated the 
output costs of lowering inflation by  reducing the credibility of the disinfla- 
tionary strategies pursued and by increasing the degree of downward wage and 
price rigidity. 
Nowadays the Spanish economy is considerably more open and flexible, 
mainly as a result of  its integration into the European Union since 1986. In 
addition, the anti-inflationary reputation of the monetary authorities has been 
greatly enhanced, the Banco de Espaiia has been granted independent status, 
and the macroeconomic policy mix has become much more balanced as a re- 
sult of progress in fiscal consolidation. Other things being equal, this makes it 
reasonable to expect that the actual cost of moving from low inflation to price 
stability will now  be far lower than in the past given the strengthened anti- 
inflationary credibility of macropolicies and the greater flexibility of the over- 
all economic structure. 
That this may indeed be the case is reflected in the performance of the econ- 
omy in the past few years, when progress on the inflationary front has been 
achieved with much better overall economic performance than normally expe- 
rienced in previous similar cyclical situations. For all the above reasons, our 
impression is that the cost estimate of 0.6 to 1 percent of  GDP per year that 
we use as a benchmark for comparison with benefits probably overestimates 
to some extent the true costs involved in moving toward price stability in Spain 
at present. If, as shown in the next section, the annual benefits do in fact exceed 103  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability in Spain 
even this conservative cost estimate, it could be claimed with some confidence 
that going toward price stability in Spain is a worthy enterprise. 
3.2  Measuring the Benefits of Going to Price Stability 
According to the analysis presented above, in Spain the benefits of achieving 
price stability outweigh the costs if the annual benefit of lower inflation is at 
least 0.6 to  1 percent of  GDP. While an attempt to evaluate all the benefits 
associated with moving from low inflation to price stability would certainly be 
ideal (see Viiials, forthcoming), we follow the more modest-but  more fea- 
sible-route  of simply assessing the benefits stemming from the interrelation- 
ship between inflation and the tax system.’ In what follows, we apply to the 
Spanish economy Feldstein’s framework (chap. 1 in this volume), taking into 
account the peculiarities of the Spanish tax system. We consider those effects 
related to the lifetime allocation of  consumption, to housing demand, to de- 
mand for money and to debt service. The total effects on each of these items 
will be decomposed into the direct effect of  the reduced distortions and the 
associated welfare effects of the corresponding revenue changes. 
3.2.1 
A reduction in the rate of return that individuals earn on their saving, due to 
increases in effective tax rates at the corporate level and at the individual level, 
implies distortions in the allocation of consumption between the early years of 
working life and the age of retirement. Since the existence of tax laws creates 
such a distortion even in the presence of  price stability, the extra distortion 
caused by inflation causes a first-order deadweight loss. In addition, associated 
effects on government revenue need to be taken into account since a loss (gain) 
of revenue would have to be offset by  increases (reductions) in other distor- 
tionary taxes. In what follows, we evaluate first the traditional welfare gain and 
then turn to assess the additional welfare effect of changes in tax revenue. 
Welfare Gain  from Reduced Distortions in Intertemporal Consumption 
Following Feldstein (1997), the direct welfare gain from reducing inflation 
is computed making use of a simple two-period model of individual consump- 
tion. In such a model individuals earn income when young and save a portion 
for retirement consumption by investing in a portfolio that earns a real net-of- 
tax return (r).  Considering that individuals retire on average after T years, the 
price of  retirement consumption (p)  that is purchased through saving is in- 
versely related to the real rate of return. As the negatively sloping compensated 
demand curve in figure 3.2 shows, the amount of retirement consumption (C) 
Inflation and the Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption 
7. Note that these benefits arise from lowering the rate of inflation even if it is perfectly antici- 
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c,  c,  CLl 
Retirement Consumption 
Fig. 3.2  Retirement consumption 
purchased by individuals becomes lower when its price (p)  rises. Because in- 
flation interacts with the tax system to increase the effective tax rate on capital 
income, and thus to reduce the real net-of-tax return to individual savers, the 
higher the inflation rate, the higher the price of retirement consumption (p,  > 
p,)  and the lower the demand for retirement consumption (C,  < C,) relative to 
the optimal situation of no inflation and no taxes (  po, Co).* 
As explained in Feldstein’s analysis, the welfare gain from inflation reduc- 
tion to an individual who saves while working and retires and consumes the 
return on his savings after retirement can be expressed as the sum of triangle 
B and rectangle D under his compensated demand curve for retirement con- 
sumption, as depicted in figure 3.2. 
Using the standard Slutsky decomposition of  the uncompensated change 
between compensated and income effects, the welfare gain (with taxes but no 
inflation) can be expressed as 
(5)  Deadweight gain  =  GI 
where pi  is the price of retirement consumption:  pi  = (1 + rj)-,O for i = 0 (no 
inflation, no taxes), 1 (taxes and no inflation), and 2 (taxes and inflation). S, is 
savings during preretirement years at the existing inflation rate; u = aS2/ay 
is the marginal propensity to save out of exogenous income, and qsp is the 
uncompensated elasticity of saving with respect to the price of retirement con- 
sumption. 
8. Throughout the text we refer to “no inflation” or “price stability” as a situation in which the 
actual inflation rate is 1.5 percent, as stated in section 3.1. 105  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability in Spain 
To evaluate the annual permanent welfare gain G, we must first measure the 
price of  retirement consumption in the three situations described above (0,  1, and 
2). First, to calculate the price of retirement consumption in the absence of infla- 
tion and taxes (p,)  we need an estimate of the real pretax return to capital. From 
1985 to 1995, the median real return to capital in the Spanish manufacturing 
sector averaged 11.9 percent, according to company accounts of  Central de 
Balances (Banco de Espaiia 1996a).9  Thus po = (1.1  19)-30  = 0.0343. 
Second, to estimate the real net-of-tax return to savers in a world of taxes 
and inflation (p,),  we need to take into account the effects of the existence of 
corporate and personal taxes. Between  1988 and  1995, taxes (net of  deduc- 
tions) paid by  corporations averaged 23 percent of pretax returns (including 
interest payments). Corporate income taxation operates under an imputation 
system that mitigates the double taxation of dividends at the shareholder level. 
Dividends carry a tax credit of 40 percent of the amount received by the share- 
holder. The tax credit is included in the income tax base, and it is deductible 
from the computed individual income tax. In the computation of the effective 
tax rate on company profits, we  have  netted out these deduction payments. 
From 1985 to 1995, dividends averaged 18 percent of pretax profits (Banco de 
Espafia 1996a). Thus the after-tax rate of return is 11.9(1 -  0.23)(1 + 0.4  X 
0.1  8), where the second term in parentheses reflects the estimated amount of 
dividend tax credits that individuals can deduct against their tax liabilities. This 
leaves an after-corporate-tax return of 9.82 percent. 
The after-tax rate of return to savers also depends on personal taxes. Spanish 
personal income taxation treats capital income differently, depending on how 
income is received. A taxpayer with average taxable income pays a statutory 
marginal tax rate of  30 percent, which is the rate falling on interest receipts. 
For dividends, we can use a marginal effective tax rate of 1.4 times 30 percent, 
or 42 percent, because the imputation tax credit is liable to taxes. Finally, the 
effective tax rate on capital gains can be calculated as in King (1977) and 
Bakhshi, Haldane, and Hatch (chap. 4 in this volume). Real capital gains are 
taxed at a fixed rate of 20 percent upon realization. The effective tax rate is 20 
percent times [+(l + i)/(+ + i)],  where + is the fraction of  accrued capital 
gains realized every period and i is the investor’s discount rate, which is the 
after-tax rate of  return to stocks. From company accounts of  Central de Bal- 
ances (see Banco de Espaiia 1996a), the ratio of  dividends to net assets be- 
tween  1985 and  1995 averaged 2.1 percent. During the same years, stocks 
quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange paid an average dividend of 5.8 percent. 
Here we use an intermediate figure of 4 percent. Over 1985-95,  the Madrid 
Stock Exchange Index rose by  12.2 percent on average in nominal terms, or 
8.1 percent times (12.2 -  (5.6 -  1.5)) in real terms. Thus 
9. We take the median since the average was severely distorted by  huge outliers. This figure 
does not differ markedly from the real net return to business capital calculated by  the OECD for 
Spain: 14.1 percent on average over the 1985-95 period. 106  Juan J. Dolado, JosC M. GonzPlez-PPramo, and Jose Viiials 
i  = (1 - 0.42) x  4%  + [l - 0.2 x  +(l +  i)/(4  +  i)]  x  8.1%. 
The solution for i is 9.5 percent for + = 0.1 or 9.2 percent for + = 0.2. In 
the absence of information on the “true” value of +, we take + = 0.1, which 
yields an estimate of  the effective marginal tax rate on real capital gains of 
around 11 percent. 
In order to compute an aggregate marginal tax rate, we  need weights for 
marginal tax rates falling on interest, dividends, and capital gains. From Cen- 
tral de Balances, the average debt-capital ratio for companies between 1985 
and 1995 was close to 50 percent, a split we use also for individuals.1° On the 
other hand, the above figures on average dividends and real capital gains imply 
a dividenddcapital-gains split of 33/67. Therefore, the aggregate personal tax 
rate on corporate after-tax profits is 
0.5  x  30% +  OS(0.33 x  42% +  0.67 x  11%)  =  25.6%. 
This tax rate implies a net real return to savers of (1 -  0.256) X 9.82 per- 
cent, or 7.31 percent. Therefore, the associated price of  retirement consump- 
tion isp, = (1.0731)-30  = 0.1204. 
According to our calculations, the joint presence of inflation and taxes leads 
to a significant wedge between the before- and after-tax real rates of return to 
individual savers. In particular, this return drops from 11.9 to 7.3 percent, in- 
ducing an increase in the price of  retirement consumption from 0.0343 to 
0.1204. 
Finally, we can now go on to calculate what the real rate of return would be 
in a world of  taxes and no inflation (pJ For this we  need to specify some 
additional tax information (see Albi and Ariznavarreta 1995).  Profit is taxed at 
a national tax rate of  35 percent. Interest payments are deductible. Capital 
gains are taxed at the corporation tax rate. Allowances for depreciation are 
available. Corporations may use the straight-line depreciation method (which 
is the only one available for buildings) and two variants of  the declining- 
balance method (“sum of the years digits” and “constant percentage”); switch- 
over is not allowed. From 1996 on, capital gains are partially indexed, and 
inventories can be valued using the LIFO method. 
Consider thus a reduction in inflation of 2 percentage points. For corpora- 
tions, this has two opposing effects. First, since nominal debt interest payments 
are tax deductible, a 2 percentage point decline in inflation raises the effective 
tax rate on profits. For a given real pretax cost of borrowing and a debt-capital 
ratio of 50 percent,” the effective tax rate would increase by 0.35(0.5)(0.02) = 
0.0035, or 0.35 percentage points. On the other hand, since depreciation allow- 
10. An issue that deserves closer attention is the role of tax-privileged savings vehicles. In 1995, 
direct holdings of firms’ bonds, loans, and stocks were less than 50 percent of total net financial 
assets held by households. On the other hand, the effective tax rate on other assets varies widely, 
a feature that is magnified when inflation increases (see Gonzilez-Piramo 1991). 
11. Data from Central de Balances 1995 (Banco de EspGa 1996a). 107  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability in Spain 
ances are not indexed, a 2 percentage point reduction in inflation lowers tax- 
able profits by  increasing the real value of the tax-deductible depreciation. We 
do not have an independent estimate of this effect comparable to that provided 
by Auerbach (1978) for the United States. However, available estimates of the 
overall effect of inflation on the effective tax rate on company profits broadly 
coincide: a 2 percentage point reduction in the rate of inflation leads to a fall 
in the effective tax rate of about 0.1 percentage points. In a comparative study 
of  effective tax rates in developed countries, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD 1991) finds that a 5 percentage point 
reduction in inflation is associated with a 0.5 percentage point fall in taxable 
profits in the case of Spain. In a more detailed analysis, Sanz (1994), by evalu- 
ating effective tax rates in a sample of 883 private industrial companies,'* finds 
that moving from 5 percent inflation to price stability causes the effective tax 
wedge to fall by  approximately 1.1 percentage points. Given a fixed capital 
stock, this means that pretax profits fall by  0.22 percentage points for each 
percentage point decline in inflation. Thus a 2 percentage point reduction in 
inflation raises the net-of-tax corporate return by 0.35(0.22)(0.02) = 0.0015, 
or 0.15 percentage points.13  That is, the net effect of achieving price stability 
is to raise the rate of return after corporate taxes from 9.82 to 9.97 percent. 
To calculate a real net-of-tax return to savers, we must consider the com- 
bined effect of taxes at the personal level. Applying the weighted personal tax 
rate to the 9.97 percent return  after corporate taxes implies a net return to 
savers of 7.42 percent. In addition, there is an independent effect of inflation 
channeled through the tax treatment of interest income.I4  Taking the share of 
debt in individuals' portfolios to be the same as the debt-capital ratio of com- 
panies, a 2 percentage point fall in inflation reduces the effective tax rate by 
0.3(0.5)(0.02) = 0.003, or 0.3 percent. Adding to the new after-tax rate of return 
(7.42 percent) the gain to savers in the taxation of interest income (0.3 percent), 
we arrive at a net-of-tax return to individuals of 7.72 percent, up 0.41 percent- 
age points from the return when inflation is 2 percentage points higher. Thus 
the associated price of retirement consumption is p, = (1  .0772)-30 = 0.1074. 
Substituting the values of po,  pI,  and pz  into the expression for the welfare 
gain (5), we have 
(6)  G,  =  0.0714S2(1 - qsp  - u). 
Next we need to measure savings during preretirement years, the marginal 
propensity to save out of exogenous income, and the uncompensated elasticity 
of saving with respect to the price of retirement consumption to evaluate the 
welfare gain in equation (5). 
12. Help from J. F. Sanz with these calculations is acknowledged. 
13. Note that this estimate implies that the effect of inflation through depreciation allowances 
is a 0.71 percent reduction in the taxable profit rate per additional 1  percent reduction in inflation. 
14. Since nominal capital gains are indexed, changes in the rate of inflation do not affect capital 
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To provide an estimate of  savings of the young at the existing rate of infla- 
tion, S,, Feldstein exploits the relationship between S,  and net personal sav- 
ings, S,,  in a steady state growth path: 
(7)  sN  GDP,  1 
n +  s,  = 
1 - (1 +  g)-T  GDP 
where n is population growth, g is the growth rate of real per capita wages, and 
T is the length of  the working period in years. Over the 1985-95  period, the 
growth of  the wage bill in real terms was  2.8 percent, and the net personal 
saving rate averaged 5.0 percent of  GDP (Banco de Espaiia 1996b). Taking 
T = 30, this implies that the saving of the young is 9 percent of GDP. However, 
recent evidence from the expenditure survey Encuesta de Presupuestos Famili- 
ares 1990-91  suggests that the foregoing figure is too low. Oliver, Raymond, 
and hjolar (1996) find that population cohorts spanning the 35-65-year  age 
range save around 20 percent of  their income. Since the ratio of personal in- 
come to GDP has been quite stable around 0.7 over the 1985-95  period, the 
implied saving ratio for the young is S, = 14 percent of GDP, a figure that we 
will use in our  calculation^.^^ 
In order to compute the welfare gain according to equation (3,  we need 
estimates for the saving function parameters. Assuming that u  equals the sensi- 
tivity of  saving to wage income, u = (S,/GDP)/a,  where a  is the share of 
wages in GDP, which is around 0.66. Thus, for S,/GDP = 0.09, u is 0.135, and 
when S,/GDP = 0.14, u  is 0.21,16 our chosen estimate. On the other hand, the 
elasticity of  saving with respect to the price of  retirement consumption can 
be calculated as in Feldstein (1997): qsp  = -(I  + r)qsr/rr  where qs,  is the 
uncompensated saving elasticity with respect to after-tax real rate of return. 
Argimbn, Gonz$ez-P&amo,  and RoldLn ( 1993) estimate semielasticities of 
private consumption with respect to the real interest rate in the -0.2  to 0 range. 
For a given income, these elasticities are linked by  the relationship: -qsr = 
-r(C/S)q,--, where r is the real after-tax interest rate, C is personal consump- 
tion, S  is private saving, and qc,  is the semielasticity of consumption with re- 
spect to the real interest rate. Taking r = 6 percent and C/S = 15.8 from na- 
tional accounts data, qsr ranges between 0 and 0.2. With r = 4 percent and 
C/S = 5, in line with expenditure surveys, the upper bound of these estimates 
would fall to 0.1. On the other hand, Estrada (forthcoming) suggests an even 
lower value for the saving elasticity (0.04). Thus we consider elasticities be- 
tween 0 and 0.2 as reasonable estimates, and 0.4 for comparability with Feld- 
stein’s calculations. 
15. Gross household saving over 1985-95  was 10.8 percent, 1.5 percent higher than the corre- 
sponding ratio in the United Kingdom. Since 11 percent is the lower bound of the saving ratio in 
the U.K. study, a 14 percent rate for Spain does not seem implausibly high. 
16. These figures are within the range of  the available econometric estimates. According to 
Marchante (1993), with an income elasticity of 0.85-0.90  and an average propensity to consume 
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Once we substitute the values for the different variables and parameters into 
equation (3,  the associated welfare gains are: 
G, (% of GDP)  IlS,  qsP 
0  0  0.79 
0.2  -0.12  0.91 
0.4  -0.24  1.03 
~ 
In spite of the differences between the economic parameters and tax systems 
of Spain and the United States, the estimated permanent annual welfare gains 
from achieving price stability are remarkably similar. 
Welfare Revenue Effects of Lower Inflation 
When inflation is lower, the tax revenue collected may be higher or lower 
than initially depending on  the induced change in retirement consumption 
along the compensated demand curve. If we start from a situation such as that 
depicted by point 2 in figure 3.2, with consumption C, and price of retirement 
consumption p,, a reduction in inflation lowers the effective tax rate on the 
return to savings, which implies a revenue loss corresponding to rectangle E. 
At the same time, a lower price of  future consumption increases retirement 
consumption, which in turn generates additional revenues, reflected by rectan- 
gle D. Thus the overall net effect on revenue can be either positive or negative 
(D -  E). Using again the uncompensated saving elasticity, since the young 
generally ignore the need to pay for future lost revenue (the compensated case), 
the aggregate revenue effect can be expressed as 
(8)  dREV, = A[[&--][y)(l  P,  -  Po  P2  -PI  -  - (p')]  p2 -  p1  GDP. 
GDP 
With the former parameter values computed in the previous subsection, the 
first effect dominates, generating the following revenue losses: 
qs,  qs3  dREV, (% of GDP) 
0  0  -0.59 
0.2  -0.12  -0.48 
0.4  -0.24  -0.37 
These values are somewhat larger than those found for the United States, 
mainly reflecting differences in the saving ratio. 
Now we can convert these revenue losses into welfare losses by scaling them 
using a deadweight loss coefficient A. The value of  A measures the marginal 
deadweight loss per peseta of additional revenue, and it depends on the specific 
taxes used to make up for the revenue losses. Feldstein (1997) uses two bench- 
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from the computable general equilibrium model calibrated by  Kehoe et al. 
(1989). An  across-the-board tax increase generating 100 pesetas of revenue 
produces a deadweight loss that is in the range of  29 to 47 pesetas.” These 
figures are very similar to those of Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) used 
by Feldstein. We take as our central estimate A = 0.4. For the sake of compar- 
ability, however, we also use A  = 1.5, an estimate that seems too high to us. 
With the two chosen values for A, the welfare revenue losses are 
dREV, (% of GDP) 
A = 0.4  A  = 1.5  IS,  Is0 
0  0  -0.24  -0.88 
0.2  -0.12  -0.19  -0.72 
0.4  -0.24  -0.15  -0.56 
As can be seen, the magnitude of the welfare revenue loss is quite sensitive to 
the assumed value of the marginal deadweight loss. All in all, however, in all 
cases but one the direct welfare gain is higher than the indirect welfare reve- 
nue loss. 
The net welfare gain from reducing inflation by 2 percent is NG, = G, + 
A dREV,.  This formula yields the following estimates (see first three rows of 
table 3.3 below): 
NG, (% of GDP) 
A = 0.4  A = 1.5  IS,  7  SP 
0  0  0.55  -0.09 
0.2  -0.12  0.72  0.19 
0.4  -0.24  0.88  0.47 
It should be noted that for A = 0.4, the range of estimates is around the size of 
U.S. calculations. 
Pensions and Nonsavers 
It must be noted that to the extent that individuals receive exogenous income 
during retirement (social security pensions), our annual estimates need to be 
adjusted downward. With exogenous income B, retirement consumption is C = 
S/p + B, whereby qcp  = (1 -  k)(qsp - l), where qcp  is the uncompensated 
elasticity of  retirement consumption with respect to its own price and k  = 
B/C is the benefit ratio for the relevant population (i.e., savers). This changes 
the welfare gain formula to GI  = 0.0714S2  [(l -  k)(l -  qsp)  -  (TI. 
In  1990, the benefit ratio for households with heads aged 65 or older was 
17. We are grateful to Antonio Manresa and Ferrln Sancho for providing us with calculations 
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around 30 percent.18  However, 42 percent of them received the minimum pen- 
sion because their contributions over their working years had been insufficient. 
Presumably, most of  these retired individuals made no savings when young 
and depend solely on their pensions. Excluding this group reduces the implied 
estimate to k = 20 percent, on the assumption that all of the remaining pen- 
sioners were young-age savers as well. To see how taking B into account would 
alter our estimate of  G,, the following summarizes the results for k = 0 and 
20 percent: 
G,  (% of GDP) 
VS,  Vso  k = 0  k = 0.2  Change (%) 
0  0  0.79  0.59  -  25 
0.2  -0.12  0.91  0.69  -  24 
0.4  -0.24  1.03  0.78  -  24 
Thus, while the existence of pensions reduces the welfare gains, the increase 
in the return to savings may  cause some nonsavers to save, increasing both 
welfare and revenues. Nevertheless, though the magnitude of this “participa- 
tion” decision is potentially important, reliable estimates are not readily avail- 
able. Thus we have no way  to assess the net effect of  these two adjustments 
and we stick to the estimates provided in table 3.3, below. 
3.2.2 
Welfare Gain  fiom Reduced Distortions in Housing Demand 
Inflation distorts all forms of  private housing demand through two main 
channels. First, it reduces the net return of  alternative assets, an effect that 
increases the demand for houses by  potential users: owner-occupiers, non- 
owner-occupiers (mainly for second residences), and landlords in the private 
rented sector. In addition, the tax advantages given to a large number of owner- 
occupiers, and to a lesser extent to landlords, are magnified by  inflation. In 
Spain, these tax privileges are quite generous by international standards, par- 
ticularly in the case of owner-occupied housing, and the size of the housing 
stock is also relatively large. Therefore, a reduction in the rate of inflation is 
quite likely to produce sizable welfare gains through both a reduction of the 
distortions caused by  housing overconsumption and a reduction in tax reve- 
nue losses. 
The welfare gains discussed above can be readily illustrated with the help 
of figure 3.3, which shows the compensated demand curve relating the quantity 
Inflation and Demand for Housing 
18. According to  Oliver et al. (1996), average expenditure of the 4.2 million households with 
heads aged 65 or older was slightly below 1.9 million pesetas. From official statistics, the average 
pension of the 3,241,908 old-age pensioners was 717,626 pesetas. A minimum pension of about 
47,000 pesetas a month was received by  1,368,142  pensioners (Albi et al. 1994). 112  Juan J. Dolado, Jose M. Gonzllez-Paramo, and Jose Viiials 
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of housing to its rental cost. In Spain, as in many other countries, the effective 
subsidies to housing demand arising from the combination of inflation and the 
tax system reduce the implied rental cost of housing and thus lead to overcon- 
sumption of housing (H,) compared to a situation of taxes but no inflation (HI) 
and of  no taxes or inflation (H,). Following Feldstein (1997), since the real 
pretax cost of  providing housing capital is R,, the existence of taxes with no 
inflation yields a welfare loss equivalent to triangle A. If, on top of taxes, there 
is also inflation, the welfare loss increases by the areas C and D in figure 3.3. 
In what follows, we estimate the deadweight gains obtained by reducing infla- 
tion (from H2 to HI)  for owner-occupied housing, non-owner-occupied hous- 
ing, and rental housing. 
In  the absence of  taxes, the user cost of  housing, R,,  net of  maintenance 
costs (m)  and depreciation (S), must equal the real return to capital in the non- 
housing sector (p);  that is, R, = m + S + p. With m = 2 percent, 6 = 2.2 
percent, and p = 11.9 percent (the real pretax return to capital in the manufac- 
turing sector), we  get R, = 16.1 percent.I9 Next we proceed to analyze the 
effect of taxes and inflation on the real rental cost, housing demand, and tax 
revenues. 
One peseta of housing capital costs a home buyer (1 -  d)(  1 + TJ pesetas, 
where T, = 7 percent is the value-added tax (VAT) rate on house purchases 
and d = 15 percent is a tax credit given to owner-occupiers on the value of the 
house including taxes. Taxpayers may enjoy this advantage five years in ad- 
vance of the purchase on the amounts invested in “housing savings accounts” 
and after the purchase on mortgage repayments. In order to qualify for the tax 
19. Fundaci6n BBV (1996) calculates that 6 increased from 1.5 percent in 1970 to 2 percent in 
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credit, the house must be the main residence of the owner and cannot be sold 
in three years. Homeowners pay income tax on an “imputed rental”: ~T,Z  per 
peseta of housing cost, where p = 2 percent is the imputation rate, T~ = 42.5 
percent is the weighted marginal tax rate of homeowners,20  and z = 33 percent 
is the average ratio of the official tax value (valor  catastral) to the market value 
of the house (see Gallego 1995). Local property taxes (impuesto  sobre bienes 
inmuebles) are levied, with an average rate T~ = 1 percent, on the tax value of 
the house and are deductible from the income tax base. Maintenance costs 
and depreciation are not deductible, and real capital gains are taxed unless the 
proceeds of the sale are reinvested in a new main residence. In addition, inter- 
est expenses are deductible in nominal terms at the marginal tax rate, with a 
ceiling of  1.6 million pesetas for a two-earner household. Given a mortgage- 
to-value ratio of  JL = 50 percent?’  an average price of  a new  house of  17 
million pesetas (see Sociedad de Tasaci6n SA 1996), and the 1995 average 
mortgage interest i,  = 10.8 percent, the interest deduction ceiling is not likely 
to be binding in most cases. Finally, it is worth noting that a large fraction of 
old houses do not benefit from tax-privileged treatment, either because they 
were bought before 1979 (when the tax credit was introduced) or because their 
mortgages have been paid off. 
With this description of the tax rules relevant to owner-occupiers with tax 
advantages, the user cost of housing can be expressed as 
RA,  = (1 -  d)(l  + T~) 
(9)  x [p.i,(l  -  T~)  + (1 -  p)(r,  + IT) + 6 + m -  (1 -  Tg)g -  IT] 
where r, = 7.3 1 percent is the real after-tax rate of return on other investments, 
T~ = 11 percent is the effective tax rate on real capital gains, g = 1.1 percent 
is the average real capital gain on housing between 1988 and 1995 according 
to Sociedad de Tasaci6n SA (5.4 -  4.3 percent), and IT  = 3.2 percent is the 
true rate of inflation in 1995. The computed rental is thus RA,  = 8.21 percent. 
In order to evaluate the real return associated with a 2 percentage point reduc- 
tion in the rate of inflation, RA,,  we have that 
~  = (1 - d)(l +  T~) 
dRA 
d.rr 
20. Individual tax data suggest, according to Leal (1992), that 45 percent of the tax credit bene- 
fits taxpayers in the richest 10 percent of  family income, 25 percent of the benefits are reaped by 
the following 20 percent, and the rest go to the remaining 70 percent of  total taxpayers. Applying 
these weights to marginal tax rates of 56,40, and 24.5 percent gives an average of 42.5 percent. 
21. According to Banco de Espaiia’s (1996b) data on financial liabilities of households, this ratio 
appears to be somewhat smaller. However, loans between individuals or  between families and 
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where it is assumed that di,,,/d.rr = 1 and dr,/d.rr = 0.21, the latter stemming 
from the fact that a 2 percentage point reduction in inflation raises the real 
after-tax return to savers from 7.31 to 7.72 percent. These calculations imply 
RA,  = 8.79 percent. In the case of owner-occupiers without tax advantages, 
expression (9) simplifies to 
(10)  RK  = (1 -t  T,)[r, -t 6 -t  m - (1 - Tg)g -t (1 - T,)T,Z  +  T$Z]. 
The resulting cost is RW, = 11.77 percent. On the other hand, since dRW/d.rr = 
(1 + T,)(dr,/d.rr)  = -0.23,  a 2 percentage point reduction in inflation raises 
the user cost to RW, = 12.23 percent. 
Next, before evaluating the welfare effects, we need an estimate of the value 
of  the housing stock and a value for the compensated elasticity of  housing 
demand with respect to the rental price. Ja6n and Molina (1994a, 1994b) pro- 
vide econometric estimates that imply a compensated price elasticity of 0.9, 
with no significant differences between owner-occupied housing and rental 
housing. We assume that this elasticity applies to all forms of housing demand 
decisions. As to the value of the housing stock, Fundacidn BBV (1996) esti- 
mates a net stock of accumulated investment in housing of 117 percent of GDP. 
Given that land values represent on average 30 percent of total cost (see Socie- 
dad de Tasaci6n SA 1996), the former estimate must be raised to 170 percent 
of GDP. An alternative calculation, based on data of average square meters per 
house and number of  houses (see Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, various 
years) and average market prices per square meter (see Ministerio de Obras 
Pliblicas y Urbanism0 1996; Sociedad de Tasacidn SA 1996), yields an esti- 
mate of  158.3 billion pesetas, or 227 percent of  1995 GDP.22 
In order to decompose this figure among alternative house uses we can refer 
to  the  shares of  owner-occupied, non-owner-occupied, and  rental  houses: 
76.55, 10.45, and 13 percent, respectively. Assuming that non-owner-occupied 
houses (second residences and empty houses) have a price that is on average 
one-half of the value of owner-occupied and rental houses, the adjusted shares 
in the housing stock are owner-occupied housing, 80.77 percent; non-owner- 
occupied housing, 5.51 percent; and rental housing,  13.72 percent. On the 
other hand, in  1994 there were 8.5 million taxpayers who declared housing 
income, of  which 3.2 million (38 percent) claimed tax credits (see Agencia 
Estatal de Administracidn Tributaria 1996). Since houses without tax advan- 
tages are old houses, with lower selling prices, a further adjustment is needed 
in order to disaggregate the value of owner-occupied housing according to tax 
status. From professional reports based on market valuations (seeq Tasaciones 
Inmobiliarias SA TINSA, 1997), the average value of a house 10 years old or 
older is 30 percent lower than the value of  an  equivalent house built more 
recently. Thus the value of the housing stock enjoying tax-privileged treatment 
can be scaled upward to 46.7 percent of owner-occupied housing. Following 
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these adjustments, stock values of  owner-occupied houses with and without 
tax advantages are HA, = 85.6 percent of  1995 GDP and HW, = 97.8 percent 
of GDP. The remaining stock values are HN, = 12.5 percent of GDP for non- 
owner-occupied housing and HR, = 3 1.1 percent of GDP for rental housing. 
Let us return to owner-occupiers enjoying tax advantages. The welfare gain 
from a 2 percentage point reduction in the rate of inflation corresponds to the 
sum of  rectangle C and triangle D under the compensated housing demand 
curve in figure 3.3 and can be expressed as 
GDP, 
R,-RA,  RA,-RA, 
RA2 
(11)  GA = E, 
where cHR  is the absolute value of the compensated elasticity of housing de- 
mand with respect to the rental cost and HA, is the  1995 market value of 
owner-occupied housing with tax advantages (59.7 billion pesetas). By substi- 
tuting previous values and estimates into equation (1  l), we have GA = 0.41 
percent of  GDP. In the case of  owner-occupied housing without tax advan- 
tages, we can use equation (1  1) with RW and HW  instead of RA and HA, to get 
GW = 0.14 percent of GDP. Adding up these figures, the resulting total welfare 
gain from the reduced distortion of owner-occupied housing demand is 0.55 
percent of  GDP.  This estimate is five times Feldstein’s calculation for the 
United States (chap. 1 in this volume), a sizable difference that reflects both 
the much higher ratio of  housing values to GDP and the enormous implicit 
subsidy that tax rules and inflation give to the purchase of  owner-occupied 
houses in Spain. With current taxes and inflation, the rental cost for owner- 
occupiers with tax advantages in  1995 was around 51 percent of the no-tax 
user cost (76 percent in the United States and 71 percent in the United King- 
dom), and a 2 percentage point reduction in inflation would increase the rental 
cost of owner-occupied housing by nearly 7 percent (4.8 percent in the United 
States and 4.2 percent in the United Kingdom). 
Inflation and taxes also distort the demand for non-owner-occupied housing. 
In this case, the rental cost can be written as 
(12) 
RN,  =  (1 +  pi,,, + (1 - p)(r, +  IT) +  S  +  m +  PT,Z 
T,Z - g(1 - Tg)  - IT], 
where we assume a mortgage-to-value ratio of  = 30 percent. Note that here 
there are no tax credits or interest deductions, and that property taxes are not 
deductible. The resulting cost is RN,  = 12.1 percent. Thus a 2 percentage point 
reduction in inflation raises the rental cost to RN, = 12.42 percent through 
its effect on the return of  alternative investments. Computing the analog of 
expression (11) we obtain a welfare gain of GN = 0.01 percent of GDP. 
Houses may be demanded as an investment: landlords buy residences and 
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maintenance costs are deductible without limit. The user cost of rental sector 
houses is 
(13) 
RR,  =  (1 +  T,)[Fi,(l  - T~)  + (1 - p)(r,  +  IT) 
+ (1 - T~)(S  +  m +  TJ) - g(l - T~)  - IT]. 
With an assumed mortgage-to-value ratio of F = 20 percent, RR, = 8.64 per- 
cent. A 2 percentage point reduction in inflation increases the rental cost to 
RR, = 9.18 percent, which in turn implies a welfare gain of GR = 0.13 percent 
of GDP. 
All in all, the value of the aggregate welfare gain from reduced distortions 
on housing implied by a 2 percentage point reduction in the rate of inflation is 
G,  =  GA +  GW +  GN +  GR  =  0.69%ofGDP. 
Welfare Revenue Effects from Lower Inflation 
Given the importance of the tax-inflation distortions and the composition of 
the housing stock, the revenue effects implied by a 2 percentage point reduc- 
tion in the inflation rate are expected to be sizable and concentrated in the 
owner-occupied sector. Consider the effect of  the inflation reduction on the 
stock of owner-occupied housing with tax advantages (from HA, to HA,): 
that is, a decline of  3.5  billion pesetas, from HA,  = 59.7 billion pesetas to 
HA, = 56.2,biilion pesetas. 
On the assumption that housing capital shifts to the business sector, there 
are as many as six different channels through which the change in housing 
demand affects government revenues. First, net property tax payments are re- 
duced by  T~(  1 -  T,)Z  AHA = -0.0066  billion pesetas. Second, as both mort- 
gage interest rates and the housing stock decline, the amount of  deductible 
interest payments falls, thus increasing net revenues by T,p[HA,i,  -  HA,(im - 
0.02)] = 0.3192 billion pesetas. Third, the tax credit on housing purchases 
declines. If  the shift of capital out of the housing sector were instantaneous, 
the net revenue increase would be dAHA, or in annuity terms -idAHA  = 
0.0499 billion pesetas, where i is the investor’s discount rate (i = 9.5 percent). 
Fourth, taxes paid on imputed housing rentals fall by  TJ~  AHA = -0.0098 
billion pesetas. Fifth, as housing capital shifts to the business sector, revenues 
from taxes on capital income increase by  -(0.119  -  0.0772)AHA  = 0.1463 
billion pesetas, where the expression in parentheses is the difference between 
the pretax return  to business investment and the after-tax return to savings 
when the rate of  inflation is 2 percentage points lower. Finally, it should be 
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sales tax and VAT,  an effect that can be estimated as -0.3617,  AHA = 0.2022 
billion pesetas, where T~ = 16 percent is the standard VAT  rate.23  The total 
revenue gain is thus dREV,  = 0.7012 billion pesetas = 1.01 percent of GDP. 
In the case of  owner-occupiers without tax advantages, the revenue gain is 
much smaller, given the absence of tax credits and mortgages outstanding. The 
reduction in the housing stock is 3.4 percent, or AHW = -2.3  billion pesetas. 
Revenue losses from reduced imputation taxes and property taxes are 0.0064 
and 0.0044 billion pesetas, respectively.  Additional business taxes yield 0.096  1 
billion pesetas, and new VATS can be estimated at 0.1328 billion pesetas. The 
ensuing net revenue effect is dREV,  = 0.2181 billion pesetas = 0.31 percent 
of GDP. 
The overall size of  the revenue gain from the interaction of  lower inflation 
and the tax treatment of  owner-occupied housing is quite large: almost three 
times Feldstein’s estimate for the United States and as much as five times the 
U.K.  However, there should be little surprise once we recall the size 
of the tax-inflation subsidy to owner-occupied housing and the popularity of 
home ownership in Spain: the net per capita stock in 1992 was $26,600, 27 
percent higher than Germany’s stock, 31 percent higher than the U.S. figure, 
and 67 percent higher than the per capita stock in the United Kingdom (see 
Todter and Ziebarth, chap. 2 in  this volume; Bakhshi et al., chap. 4 in this 
volume). 
Turning to the non-owner-occupied sector (second residences and empty 
houses), the revenue effect is the result of two opposing changes: a transfer of 
capital to the business sector, which yields additional business taxes and VAT 
revenues, and a revenue loss from lower property taxes and imputation taxes. 
The reduction in the stock of houses is 2.3 percent, or AHN = -0.20  billion 
pesetas. The additional revenues arising from the business sector are calculated 
as -[(0.119 -  0.0772) + 0.361~,]AHN  = 0.0199 billion pesetas. The change 
in property taxes is T~Z  AHN = -0.0007  billion pesetas, and the loss of impu- 
tation taxes is T$Z  AHN = -0.0006.  Thus the resulting net revenue gain is 
dREW,  = 0.0186 billion pesetas = 0.03 percent of GDP. 
Consider lastly the rental sector. Given an increase in the user cost of 0.54 
percentage points, the implied decline in demand is -5.3  percent, or AHR = 
-  1.15 billion pesetas. The revenue impact is fivefold: (1) increased revenue 
from business investment, -(O.  119 -  0.0772)  1.15 = 0.0481 billion pesetas; 
23. New business investment generates additional sales and value added, which in turn implies 
more revenues in an  amount that could be nonnegligible. Note that value added, VA, equals capital 
income, pK, plus wage income, W;  Given a fixed labor income share WIVA = 0.66, we get VAlK = 
3.03, implying 36.1 percent (= 3.03 X 0.119) of the additional capital stock per year when p = 
11.9 percent. New business capital of 3.5 billion pesetas arising from the owner-occupied sector 
would generate  1.2635 billion pesetas of value added per  year. With a VAT  rate  of  16 percent 
this translates into 0.2022 billion pesetas per year of additional revenue, or 0.29 percent of GDP 
per year. 
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(2) additional revenue from VAT,  -0.361(0.16)(1.15)  = 0.0664 billion pese- 
tas; (3) loss of  interest deductions, 0.2[(0.108)(21.7)  - (0.088)(20.55)]  = 
0.0455 billion pesetas; (4) loss of maintenance and depreciation deductions, 
-~~(rn  + 8)AHR = 0.0215 billion pesetas; (5) loss of property taxes, n,(1  - 
7,)AHR = -0.0022  billion pesetas. The revenue effect from all these sources 
is dREV,  = 0.1793 billion pesetas = 0.26  percent of GDP. 
The overall revenue change through all sorts of housing demand is the sum 
of the previous effects, yielding 
dREV,  =  dREV,  +  dREV,  +  dREV,  +  dREVR 
=  1.1172 billion pesetas  =  1.60% of GDP. 
It should be noted that 70 percent of this revenue gain comes from two sources: 
additional VAT  (0.59  percent of GDP) and loss of  interest deductions (0.52 
percent of GDP). 
In order to calculate the welfare effects of the above revenue gain we have 
to multiply it by  A. For A  = 0.4,  it yields 0.64 percent of GDP; for A  = 1.5, 
2.40 percent of GDP. As can be observed, the welfare revenue gains are quite 
significant. Relative to the direct welfare gains, they are roughly similar for 
low values of the marginal deadweight loss, and more than three times as high 
for high values (see row 4 in table 3.3). 
Finally, the net welfare gain arising from the effects of a 2 percentage point 
reduction in inflation on the housing market is the sum of the direct gain from 
the reduced distortion and the indirect welfare gain associated with the re- 
sulting revenue gains, given by 
NG,  =  G, +  AdREV,  = (0.69  +  A1.60)%ofGDP. 
The overall gains are 1.33  percent of GDP for A  = 0.4 and 3.09 percent of 
GDP for A  = 1.5  (see row 4 in table 3.3  below). Not surprisingly, given our 
previous discussion of the magnitude of the subsidy to owner-occupied hous- 
ing and of the size of the housing stock in Spain, the net welfare gains are quite 
large: around six times the figures for the United States. 
Needless to say, there are large margins of  uncertainty in our calculations. 
In this respect, two key parameter values are the housing demand elasticity 
and the mortgage-to-value ratio in the owner-occupied tax-advantaged sector. 
Suppose that the mortgage-to-value ratio were p = 25 percent instead of the 
maintained p,  = 50 percent. The resulting overall direct gain would fall by 0.1 
percent of  GDP to 0.59 percent, still a sizable improvement. Revenue gains 
would decline to 1.29 percent of GDP from 1.6 percent, which in turn implies 
net welfare gains of  1.11 percent of GDP for A = 0.4 and 2.52  percent of GDP 
for A = 1.5. Assume, in addition to p = 25 percent, that the true value of  E, 
were 0.45 instead of 0.90. Then the net gains in this case would be 0.84 percent 
of GDP for A = 0.4 and 2.00 percent of GDP for A = 1.5. Therefore, although 119  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability in Spain 
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Fig. 3.4  Money demand and seigniorage 
halving both p,  and E,  reduces our reference estimates by about 35 percent, it 
still leaves welfare gains far larger than those found for the United States. 
3.2.3  Inflation and the Demand for Money 
WeEfare Effects of Distorting Money Demand 
Perhaps the best-known source of welfare loss resulting from inflation re- 
lates to distortions on money demand. As established in the seminal work of 
Bailey (1956), an increase in inflation increases the opportunity cost of holding 
money by raising interest rates and reduces the level of money holdings rela- 
tive to the social optimum. This effect (“shoe leather costs”) makes inflation 
socially costly because, as Fnedman (1969) noted, money holdings are optimal 
only when the nominal interest rate is zero, thus equating the marginal utility 
and the (zero) social marginal cost of money. Consequently, any increase in an 
already positive nominal interest rate tends to lower the level of money hold- 
ings further below the optimum. 
Assuming an initial situation characterized by inflation (TJ  and a positive 
nominal interest rate (in, = r,, + TJ,  reducing inflation entails a welfare gain. 
As shown in figure 3.4, which plots the demand for money as a function of the 
nominal interest rate, a reduction in inflation (from T,  to nI)  leads to an in- 
crease in money demand (from M, to MI)  and to a welfare gain represented by 
area C plus area D between the money demand curve and the zero opportunity 
cost line. As can be seen, the size of the gain hinges on the interest elasticity 
of money demand. 
To compute the welfare gain it is necessary to estimate the change in nomi- 
nal interest rates induced by the reduction in inflation and the induced increase 
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(3.5 - lS), the net-of-tax return on the debt-equity portfolio in Spain (rnz)  is 
7.31 percent, thus leading to a nominal interest rate (inz)  of 9.31 percent (7.31 
+ 2). When the “true” inflation rate (T,)  is zero (1.5 - lS), the real and 
nominal net-of-tax return (r,,  = inl)  becomes 7.72 percent  since dr/d.sr  = 
-0.21.  Thus the welfare gain corresponding to the area C + D in the figure is 
=  0.0772[1 +  OS(0.0931 - 0.0772)](Ml - MI) 
= -  0.085 15~,M  ~  (0.0159)GDP 
rn +  T 
In Spain, the long-run interest rate elasticity of  money demand (eM)  is esti- 
mated to be roughly 0.2, and in  1995 non-interest-bearing money balances 
amounted to 8.930 billion pesetas, or 12.8 percent of GDP (M). Substituting 
these values into equation (13) yields a total welfare gain of G, = 0.04 percent 
of GDP. Therefore, it follows that the size of the welfare gain associated with 
changes in money demand (Bailey effect) is rather small, although almost 
twice that for the United States. This is mainly due to the money-to-income 
ratio being twice as large in Spain. 
Welfare Revenue Effects of  Changes in Money Demand 
Following Feldstein (1997), the reduction in inflation leads to changes in 
government revenue through several channels: (i) the loss of seigniorage asso- 
ciated with the lower “tax” on money holdings (the so-called Phelps effect), 
(ii) the loss due to the portfolio shift from other productive assets to money 
balances, (iii) and the gain related to the one-time replacement of  interest- 
bearing government debt by higher money balances. These sources of revenue 
changes are examined in what follows. 
The marginal change in seigniorage induced by a unit reduction in inflation 
is shown in Feldstein (1997) to be equal to 
dSeigniorage/dT  =  M  +  T(dM/da) 
=  M/GDP{l - E,[d(r,  + T)/~T](T/~  + n)}GDP 
= 0.1236GDP. 
Thus the loss of  seigniorage will be (0.02)(0.1236)GDP = 0.25 percent of 
GDP. As in the United States, the “Phelps revenue effect” is higher than the 
“Bailey money demand effect.” 
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(nontaxed), since the reduction in productive capital is equal to the increase in 
money balances, we have that 
MI - M2  =  E,MT  ‘” - lnl =  0.0044GDP. 
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When these assets are invested in productive capital they earn a real pretax 
return of  11.9 percent but a net-of-tax return of only 7.72 percent. The differ- 
ence between the two is the combined effective tax rate at the corporate and 
personal levels. Applying this difference to the reduction in productive capital 
yields a revenue loss of (0.119 -  0.0772)0.0044GDP = 0.02 percent of GDP. 
Concerning the substitution of  increased money balances for government 
debt, this implies a one-time reduction of  the stock of government debt and 
thus a permanent reduction in debt service. Taking a value for the nominal 
interest on government debt (r,J of  8.5 percent in  1995, a value for the per- 
sonal tax rate (0,)  of 0.3, and a “true” inflation rate in 1995 of 2.8 percent, the 
real net-of-tax interest rate on government debt would be (1 -  0.3)8.5 -  2.8 
percent = 3.2 percent, and the reduced debt service in perpetuity rng  (M, - 
M,) = 0.01 percent of GDP. 
Combining the above three revenue effects yields a total revenue loss of 
dREV,  = -0.25 - 0.02 +  0.01  = -0.26%of  GDP. 
In welfare terms, the revenue loss depends on the assumed value of the mar- 
ginal deadweight loss, amounting to 0.10 percent of GDP for A = 0.4 and 0.39 
percent of GDP for A = 1.5. 
On the basis of the above calculations, the rotul welfare gain (direct welfare 
plus indirect welfare revenue effects) can be estimated as 
NG,  =  G, +  AdREV,  = (0.037 - A0.26)%of GDP. 
For A  = 0.4, this yields -0.07  percent of GDP; for A  = 1.5, -0.35  percent 
of GDP. 
As can be seen, reducing inflation implies overall a welfare loss through the 
money demand channel. The reason is that the welfare losses arising from lost 
revenue more than outweigh the welfare gains resulting from reduced distor- 
tion of money holdings; that is, the Phelps effect dominates the Bailey effect 
(see row 5 of table 3.3 below). 
Finally, it is important to point out that all of the above estimates hinge on 
the value taken for the interest elasticity of money demand. According to Lucas 
(1994), the money demand curve becomes infinitely elastic for sufficiently low 
nominal interest rates. Thus we would be seriously underestimating the direct 
welfare gain from reducing the distortion on money demand. On the contrary, 
according to Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996), we would be seriously overes- 
timating the direct welfare gain if it is the case-as  these authors claim-that 
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nominal interest rates. Unfortunately, the empirical work on money demand 
functions in Spain is based on linear specifications, and it is not yet possible 
to know whether we  are under- or overestimating the direct welfare gain on 
money holdings. 
3.2.4  Debt Service and the Government Budget Constraint 
This final item relates to the higher cost of servicing the national debt that 
results from a reduction in inflation of 2 percentage points. This happens be- 
cause inflation does not alter the real pretax interest rate on government debt 
while the inflation premium is taxed at the personal level. If  the debt-GDP 
ratio is to be kept constant, an increase in taxes is required. This, in turn, im- 
plies welfare costs insofar as taxes are distortionary. 
As shown in Feldstein (1997), in equilibrium the revenue loss resulting from 
lower inflation can be approximated as the product of the change in inflation 
(dr),  the effective tax rate (Om),  and the debt-GDP ratio (b):  dREV, = dr  O,b. 
Considering that in Spain 8,  is 30 percent and the relevantz5  debt-GDP ratio is 
40 percent (once we exclude debt in the hands of foreign investors and tax- 
favored institutional investors), the revenue change is 
dFEV,  = -  (0.02)(0.3)(0.4)  = -  0.24% of GDP. 
In turn, the net welfare revenue is 
NG,  = -0.24X, 
which together yields -0.10  percent of GDP for X = 0.4 and  -0.36  percent 
of GDP for h = 1.5 (see row 6 of  table 3.3).  These figures are in line with 
those obtained for the United States. 
3.2.5  Total Benefits 
Table 3.3 summarizes our estimates of the permanent annual benefits that 
can be obtained when moving from low inflation to price stability in Spain. As 
can be seen from the last three rows of the table, the total welfare effect is in 
all cases positive and sizable, ranging from 1.71 to 2.87 percent of GDP.26 
The values reported in table 3.3 correspond to different assumptions regard- 
ing the marginal deadweight loss per peseta of additional revenue (A)  and the 
interest elasticity of saving (q),  and some of these assumptions look more plau- 
sible than others. In particular, the empirical evidence available for Spain sug- 
gests that X is very close to 0.4 and q  is somewhere between 0 and 0.2. In this 
25. If debt holders are tax exempt to begin with, there are no revenue losses. 
26. It could be claimed that we are not taking into account the welfare losses resulting from the 
need to  raise distortionary taxation to finance the revenue shortfall and higher unemployment 
compensation payments stemming from the lower output-transitorily  or permanently-induced 
by the disinflation process and discussed in section 3.1 of the paper. In the case of  Spain, our 
calculations show that this would amount, in welfare terms, to less than 0.1 percent of GDP in the 
more realistic scenario of A  = 0.4,  and to 0.3 percent of GDP when A = 1.5. These calculations 
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Table 3.3  Net Welfare Effect of Achieving Price Stability (percent of GDP) 
Welfare Effect of 
Direct Effect  Revenue Change  Total Effect 
of Reduced 
Distortion  A = 0.4  A = 1.5  A = 0.4  A = 1.5 
Source of Change  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Consumption timing 
q=o  0.79  -0.24  -0.88  0.55  -0.09 
q = 0.2  0.91  -0.19  -0.72  0.72  0.19 
q = 0.4  1.03  -0.15  -0.56  0.88  0.47 
Housing demand  0.69  0.64  2.4  1.33  30.9 
Money demand  0.04  -0.10  -0.39  -0.07  -0.35 
Debt service  -0.10  -0.36  -0.10  -0.36 
Total 
q=o  1.52  0.20  0.77  1.71  2.29 
q = 0.2  1.64  0.25  0.93  1.88  2.57 
q = 0.4  1.76  0.29  1.09  2.04  2.87 
Note: Table reports changes due to a 2 percentage point reduction in inflation. q  is the uncompen- 
sated interest rate elasticity of saving. A is the marginal deadweight loss per peseta of additional 
revenue. Numbers in boldface show what we consider to be more realistic figures for Spain given 
the available empirical evidence on A and q. 
more realistic scenario, the annual welfare benefits are estimated to be still 
quite significant, ranging from 1.71 to 1.88 percent of GDP. 
As can be seen, the four types of effects considered in the table contribute 
quite differently toward the total net welfare effect. While the changes induced 
by lower inflation on retirement consumption and housing demand contribute 
favorably to the total welfare effect, the induced changes in money demand 
and in the cost of servicing the public debt make negative contributions. Under 
the most realistic scenario, the first two factors amount to 1.88 to 2.05 percent 
of GDP and the remaining two to -0.17  percent of GDP. 
Another interesting feature is that both the direct welfare effect and  the indi- 
rect welfare revenue effect are positive when we aggregate over the four eco- 
nomic categories in the table. Nevertheless, it should be observed that the tradi- 
tional direct welfare effect is significantly higher than the indirect effect. For 
instance, in the more realistic scenario, the direct effect ranges from 1.52 to 
1.64  percent of GDP, while the indirect effect ranges from 0.20 to 0.25 percent 
of GDP. So while the conceptual framework employed in the paper has clearly 
gained from the inclusion of indirect revenue effects, together with traditional 
direct welfare effects, in our more realistic scenario this does not seem empiri- 
cally to make a big difference. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the net welfare gains of achieving price 
stability increase with the marginal deadweight loss and with the interest elas- 
ticity of saving. One reason is that since a reduction of inflation increases total 
revenue, it allows other distortionary taxes to be reduced. Thus the larger the 
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Table 3.4  Underlying Variables and Parameters in the Evaluation of the 
Benefits of Going to Price Stability, Spain versus the United States 
Variable or Parameter  Spain  United States 
Fiscal 
Average tax on corporations (%) 
Marginal corporate income tax (%) 
Marginal capital income tax on individuals (%) 
Effective marginal tax on capital gains (%) 
Rate of property tax (%) 
Tax credit on value of the house (%) 
Marginal deadweight loss 
Pretax real return to capital in corporate sector (%) 
Debt-capital ratio in corporations (%) 
Share of equity in individuals’ portfolios (%) 
Interest paid on mortgage (%) 
Value of owner-occupied housing (% of GDP) 
Currency plus bank reserves (% of GDP) 
Relevant government debt (% of GDP) 
Mortgage as a proportion of the value of owner- 
occupied housing (%) 
Maintenance cost (%) 
Rate of depreciation (%) 
Rate of growth of the wage bill (%) 
Inflation average”  (%) 
Current inflationb (%) 
Inflation bias (%) 
GDP grow&  (%) 
Share of wages in GDP (%) 
Saving of the young (% of GDP) 
Behavioral 
Elasticity of saving with respect to real net-of-tax 
return 
Compensated elasticity of housing demand with 
respect to rental pricing 
Elasticity of demand for money with respect to 
interest rate 



























































Suurces: Feldstein (1997) and authors’ elaboration. 
”1985-95  for Spain; 1960-94  for the United States. 
b1996  for Spain. 
‘1964-95  for Spain; 1970-94  for the United States. 
fare revenue gain. The other reason is that the more interest elastic saving is, 
the larger the favorable effect of a reduction in inflation on the amount of retire- 
ment consumption purchased by individuals and the lower the revenue loss. 
Table 3.4 presents the values of  the underlying variables and parameters 
used in evaluating the benefits of  going to price stability in Spain (and, for 125  Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability in Spain 
Table 3.5  Net Welfare Effects: Spain versus the United States (percent of GDP) 
Direct  Revenue  Total  Difference 
Spain  U.S.  Spain  U.S.  Spain  U.S. 
Consumption timing  0.79  0.73  -0.24  -0.17  0.55  0.56  -0.01 
Housing demand  0.69  0.1  0.64  0.12  1.33  0.22  +1.11 
Money demand  0.04  0.02  -0.10  -0.05  -0.07  -0.03  -0.04 
Debt service  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  0 
Total  1.52  0.85  0.20  -0.21  1.71  0.65  +  1.06 
Source; U.S. figures from Feldstein (chap. 1 in this volume). 
Note: Table reports changes due to a 2 percentage point reduction in inflation. q = 0 and X = 0.4. 
comparative purposes, in the United States), and table 3.5 presents a compari- 
son of our results with those obtained by  Feldstein for the United States within 
the same conceptual framework (chap. 1 of this volume). For the sake of com- 
parability, we  take A  = 0.4 and -q  = 0, which correspond to values for our 
more realistic scenario. As can be seen by looking at the last row of table 3.5, 
the total net welfare gain is almost three times larger in Spain (1.7 1 percent of 
GDP) than in the United States (0.65 percent of GDP). This is mostly due to 
the very different net gains associated with the effect of a reduction in inflation 
on the demand for housing (1.33 percent of GDP in Spain vs. 0.22  percent 
in the United States). For the other three economic categories, the gains are 
remarkably similar, as can be seen in the last column of the table. According 
to our analysis, the much larger effects of reduced inflation on housing demand 
in Spain mainly'reflect the much higher ratio of housing values to GDP in this 
country and the huge implicit subsidy that tax rules and inflation give to the 
purchase of  owner-occupied houses. Naturally, both factors are deeply inter- 
related from a general equilibrium viewpoint. 
3.3  Costs and Benefits Compared 
3.3.1  Benefits Minus Costs 
The most important difficulty economists face when examining the costs 
and benefits of moving from low inflation to price stability is the absence of a 
fully satisfactory general equilibrium theory of money. In this paper, we have 
followed the more pragmatic route of combining a macroeconomic estimate 
of  the costs and a microeconomic estimate of the benefits of  achieving price 
stability in Spain within an admittedly partial equilibrium framework. Rather 
than trying to identify and quantify all of the various channels through which 
the inflationary process entails costs and benefits, we focus only on those chan- 
nels that we consider most relevant. 
Table  3.6 summarizes our estimates of  both the costs and the benefits of 
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Table 3.6  Summary of Benefits and Costs of Achieving Price Stability 
(percent of GDP) 
A = 0.4  X = 1.5 
Benefits 
q=o  1.71  2.29 
q = 0.2  1.88  2.57 
q = 0.4  2.04  2.87 
costs  0.60-1.00  0.60-1.00 
Benefits minus costs 
q=o  0.71-1.11  1.29-1.69 
q = 0.2  0.88-1.28  1.57-1.97 
q = 0.4  1  .04-1.44  1.87-2.27 
Note:  Table reports permanent annual benefits and costs due to a 2 percentage point reduction in 
inflation. Numbers in boldface show what we consider to be more realistic figures for Spain given 
the available empirical evidence on X and 7. 
mates of the sacrifice ratio to arrive at a rough figure for how costly it is to 
move to price stability in terms of lost output. We have concluded that in Spain 
such costs are in the range of 0.6 to 1 percent of GDP per year on a permanent 
basis. As regards the benefits, we have adopted Feldstein’s (1997) approach 
and focused on the interactions between inflation and capital income taxation. 
Since inflation leads to increases in the effective rate of capital income taxation 
in non-fully  indexed tax systems, it distorts consumption-saving decisions and 
asset allocation decisions, resulting in welfare losses. Our empirical estimates 
of the welfare gains to be obtained from achieving price stability in Spain- 
shown in table 3.3-are  quite sizable by international standards, ranging from 
1.7 to 2.9 percent of GDP per year on a permanent basis, depending on the 
assumptions made about the marginal deadweight loss of raising revenue and 
the interest elasticity of saving. In what we consider to be the more realistic 
scenario, the benefits are estimated to be in the range of  1.7 to 1.9 percent of 
GDP per year on a permanent basis. Consequently, the net bene$t  (benefit mi- 
nus costs) of going from low inflation to price stability in Spain is estimated 
to be-in  the more realistic scenario-0.7  to 1.3 percent of GDP per  year on 
a permanent basis. Thus, according to our preliminary results, achieving price 
stability seems to be a worthwhile enterprise. 
Given that our paper applies Feldstein’s (1997) methodology to Spain, it is 
useful to compare our results to those he obtained for the United States. If 
we take Feldstein’s more realistic scenario, then the estimated output costs of 
achieving price stability in the United States are equivalent to 0.16 percent of 
GDP per year on a permanent basis,*’ while the estimated benefits are 0.6 to 
1 percent of GDP per year, again on a permanent basis. This yields an annual 
27. While Feldstein finds the output costs of disinflation to be transitory in the United States, 
the figure mentioned in the text corresponds to an annuity that has the same present value as the 
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net benefit of 0.5 to 0.8 percent of GDP, which is similar to, although some- 
what smaller than, the 0.7 to 1.3 percent of GDP we find for Spain. Excluding 
the revenue effects from VAT,  which does not exist in the United States, the 
annual net benefit for Spain would fall to 0.5 to 1.0 percent of GDP, a figure 
that is almost identical to the U.S. range of estimates. 
The similarity between the estimated net benefits of achieving price stability 
in Spain and in the United States is rather striking considering the very signifi- 
cant differences between the two countries’ economic structures and tax sys- 
tems. Still, it happens to be the case that while the costs of  achieving price 
stability are significantly higher in Spain so are the benefits, thus leading to 
net benefits of the same order of magnitude in both cases. 
3.3.2  Some Caveats 
As emphasized earlier, our calculations of the net benefits of going from low 
inflation to price stability are based on a relatively simple partial equilibrium 
framework. Still, even if we stick to the methodology that we have followed 
here, a number of factors should be mentioned to get some idea of the margin 
of uncertainty of our cost and benefit estimates. 
Regarding the costs, since our simple macromodel is linear it does not take 
into account the possibility-often  mentioned-that  the Phillips curve be- 
comes flatter as the inflation rate gets lower, thus making it costlier to achieve 
a given reduction in  While there is no empirical evidence on this 
issue in the Spanish case, if the above criticism were valid we would be under- 
estimating the true output costs of further reducing inflation. This is, neverthe- 
less, not the only-nor  possibly the most important-source  of  bias in our 
estimate of the costs of reducing inflation. Indeed, it could seriously be claimed 
that we have overestimated the output costs of achieving further disinflation in 
Spain because anti-inflationary policies are now more credible and the degree 
of downward wage and price flexibility higher than in the past. While it is hard 
to assess which of the two biases is likely to be larger, the recent performance 
of  the Spanish economy indicates that the disinflation process has tended to 
become easier in recent years, even as the inflation rate has been progressively 
lowered. This would suggest that, if anything, we may have empirically over- 
estimated-rather  than underestimated-on  balance the true output costs of 
achieving price stability in Spain today. 
As regards the benefits, by focusing on the interaction between inflation and 
capital income taxation, we have omitted other interactions with the tax system 
28. As recently suggested by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), reaching an inflation rate that 
is low enough to be consistent with price stability may deprive policymakers of the possibility of 
achieving the real wage cuts that are needed for the economy to perform adequately. Yet  it is 
unclear to us why those real wage cuts may not also be obtained through nominal wage cuts in an 
environment where price stability prevails. Furthermore, it could be argued that in countries with 
wage  indexation mechanisms-like  Spain-going  to a low enough rate of inflation leads to a 
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that could lower our estimated welfare gains from reducing inflation. In partic- 
ular, as noted by  Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1996), shifting to a lower 
rate of inflation has a permanent negative effect on tax revenues due to incom- 
plete or delayed indexation of the transfer payment system and partial index- 
ation of personal income tax brackets in progressive tax systems. Against this, 
it can be argued that with a lower inflation rate there is also a permanent in- 
crease in the real value of the tax revenues collected, insofar as tax collection 
lags behind the actual generation of income. While we have not attempted to 
make such estimates for Spain, the evidence presented by Persson et al. for 
Sweden suggests that, overall, our benefits could be overestimated. 
On the other hand, a number of benefits also associated with lowering infla- 
tion are not related to the tax system and have not been considered in our 
analysis: for example, the saving from not having constantly to revise prices 
(menu  costs),  the  more  efficient  allocation of  resources that  comes  with 
lower-and  thus generally more stable-inflation  rates, and the redistribution 
of income and wealth in favor of those with fewer resources to protect them- 
selves against inflation. While these benefits are quite hard to quantify reliably, 
they may nevertheless be significant (see, e.g., Andrts and Hernando, chap. 8 
in this volume; Gylfason and Herbertsson 1996). 
It is evident from the above that it is rather difficult at this stage to ascertain 
the net effect of the various factors mentioned regarding the net benefits of 
going from low inflation to price stability. Nevertheless, it is comforting to 
know that the sources of bias might to some extent cancel each other out. 
Another word of caution concerns the time profiles of costs and benefits in 
our calculations. Regarding the costs, timing considerations have been taken 
fully into account when computing, in section 3.2, the “cost annuity” that is 
equivalent in present value to the transitory output losses resulting from disin- 
flation. Nevertheless, regarding the benefits we have followed Feldstein (1997) 
in assuming that all the adjustments to the new equilibrium with price stability 
take place instantaneously and thus that the “steady state” benefits are obtained 
from year one. Thus, if it turned out to be the case that these adjustments take 
several years to be completed, this would reduce the estimated “benefit annu- 
ity.” This effect might be particularly relevant in the case of demand for hous- 
ing given the structural characteristics of  the housing market. Since the re- 
duced housing  distortion accounts for three-quarters of  the estimated total 
welfare gain of  1.7 to 1.9 percent of GDP per year in our more realistic sce- 
nario (see table 3.3), this downward revision might be nonnegligible. 
In order to assess how important these time profile considerations are, we 
have considered how our net benefit calculations would be affected if, for ex- 
ample, the benefits stemming from housing demand were to occur, say, only 
after five or ten years rather than instantly. If we take, for simplicity, the more 
realistic scenario of  h = 0.4 and q = 0.0 or 0.2, our findings are that the 
benefits are always higher than the costs in the five-year case, while in the ten- 
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Table 3.7  Sensitivity Analysis: Benefits Minus Costs (percent of GDP) 
T=O  T=5  T=  10 
Mean value  0.62, 1.09  0.12,0.53  -0.29,0.14 
Median  0.60, 1.14  0.09, 0.59  -0.22.0.21 
Percentage of cases when benefits are 
larger than costs  94.1, 100  64.7, 92.8  37.7, 53.6 
Nore: In each pair of numbers, the first refers to the case of permanent output costs (1 percent of 
GDP per year in annuity terms) and the second to the case of transitory output costs (0.6 percent 
of GDP per year in annuity terms). 
of 0.6 to 1 percent of GDP.29  Consequently, it seems that our conclusions would 
continue to hold even when considering significant delays in the benefits accru- 
ing from housing. 
Next, to check how robust our results are, we have carried out a sensitivity 
analysis by allowing some of  the parameters to take on a range of values con- 
taining those reference estimates considered above.3o  In particular, we have 
specified the following ranges for the key parameters: q = 0.0,O.  1, . . . ,  0.4; 
E,  = 0.5, 0.6, . . . ,0.9; X = 0.4,0.5, . . . ,  1.5; and p = 0.25 and 0.50. These 
ranges give rise to 600 possible calculations of  net benefits (benefits minus 
costs), which have been tabulated in table 3.7 for three alternative values of T 
(the number of  years after which the housing benefits accrue). As can be seen 
from table 3.7,  if the housing benefits start accruing within the first five years, 
it is very likely that the benefits of  going to price stability will continue to 
exceed the costs. 
A criticism that can be made regarding our conclusions is that since the 
welfare benefits from lower inflation could be obtained alternatively through 
first-best tax reform at an unchanged rate of inflation, it is fiscal policy rather 
than monetary policy that should be adjusted to reap the ensuing welfare gains. 
The problem is, however, that in practice it is very difficult to foresee such a 
radical tax reform, as a result of well-known political economy problems. 
In the same vein, it could be argued that once disinflationary demand poli- 
cies have been undertaken-and  the output costs borne-if  there were a tax 
reform of  the sort described above, there would then be no more benefits to 
reap from having achieved price stability after the reform is in place, thus lead- 
ing to an unfavorable “ex post” relationship between benefits and costs. A reply 
to this would be that as long as a.fully comprehensive tax reform does not 
come very early in time, it will still be worthwhile to undertake demand poli- 
29. In particular, the benefits (B)  will be larger than the costs (0  in annuity terms if B = xR + 
xHe?‘ > C, where xR is annual benefits other than housing and xH is annual housing benefits 
starting to accrue after T years (T = 5, 10). 
30. While, for the sake of comparability with the other country studies contained in this volume, 
we have omitted from our benefits calculations summarized in table 3.3 the impact of  the net 
revenue losses arising frond the output costs due to disinflation (i.e., payments for unemployment 
compensation), these nevertheless were taken into account when elaborating table 3.7. 130  Juan J. Dolado, Jose M. Gonzalez-Paramo, and Jose Viiials 
cies oriented toward price stability. In fact, for Spain we have calculated that 
in the case of temporary output costs-which  are borne mainly during the first 
five years-going  to price stability would be justified on benefit-cost grounds 
as long as the tax reform does not happen during the first six years. For the 
case where the output costs are permanent, going to price stability would be 
justified as long as the tax reform does not take place during the first eleven 
years. 
To  conclude, it is evident from the above discussion that our cost-benefit 
analysis of achieving price stability in Spain is merely a rough and preliminary 
attempt to study a very complex phenomenon. Still, because it captures some 
of what are generally considered to be the most important costs and benefits, 
it is a useful starting point. According to our empirical results, going from low 
inflation to price stability in Spain seems to be a worthy enterprise, yielding a 
net beneficial effect of 0.7 to 1.3 percent of GDP per year in the more reason- 
able scenarios. 
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